A recent paper published in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences introduces a novel approach called “mathematized phenomenology,” proposed by Assistant Professor Robert Prentner from the Institute of Humanities at ShanghaiTech University. This method seeks to directly study subjective experience using mathematical tools, challenging traditional approaches to consciousness science and potentially offering new theoretical support for neuroscience.
Conventionally, consciousness research has relied heavily on third-person perspectives, such as observing brain activity through EEG or fMRI. However, Prentner argues that this approach often overlooks the first-person perspective—the direct, subjective experience of individuals. He suggests that phenomenology, the philosophical discipline focused on subjective experience, can bridge this gap through mathematization, enabling a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness.
The study zeroes in on several core phenomenological concepts, using mathematical models to uncover the deep structure of consciousness. For instance, “intentionality” refers to the way consciousness is always directed toward an object—when we see a cup, we not only perceive its shape but also grasp its potential use. Prentner employs topology, a branch of mathematics, to model this intentionality as a fusion of multiple perspectives. Another key concept, “minimal subjectivity,” captures the inherent “for-me-ness” of experience, even without an explicit self, explored here through the mathematical notion of duality in spaces. Additionally, the “lifeworld” highlights how consciousness is embedded in biological and social contexts, with mathematical models illustrating how interactions between self and world shape experience. Finally, “time-consciousness” reflects the flowing nature of experience, akin to a melody, which Prentner describes mathematically by drawing on Husserl’s three-dimensional temporal structure of retention, primal impression, and protention.
Prentner emphasizes that his goal is not to answer the ultimate question of “what consciousness is” but to investigate “what consciousness does”—how instances of conscious experience relate and form structures. He introduces a mereological “toy model,” using mathematical sets and relations to demonstrate how parts of conscious experience connect into a whole. Though preliminary, this model lays the groundwork for more sophisticated mathematical tools, such as category theory.
The significance of this research extends beyond philosophy. It promises to bridge phenomenological insights with neuroscience, aiding scientists in understanding how the brain generates consciousness. Prentner posits that mathematized phenomenology can impose constraints on neurocomputational processes, explaining how the brain integrates information to produce unified experiences. For example, it could link existing theories like the global neuronal workspace theory and integrated information theory, offering a more holistic framework for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC).
Despite the current “pre-paradigmatic” state of consciousness science, where no unified theory has emerged, Prentner believes mathematized phenomenology can serve as a bridge between philosophy and scientific data. He calls for more researchers to join this field, exploring the potential of mathematical tools like dynamical systems theory or topology. “This isn’t about reducing consciousness to numbers,” Prentner explains, “but about using mathematics to reveal the patterns behind experience. It shifts us from ‘who am I’ to ‘how do I perceive,’ potentially transforming our understanding of consciousness.”
This research opens a new avenue for consciousness science, with the potential to one day predict or even modulate conscious experiences, impacting fields like psychology, artificial intelligence, and medicine.